Created: 04-08-21
Last Login: 04-08-21
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TIME TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST CONTAINER SHIP FIRES
TIME TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST CONTAINER SHIP FIRES
This year has already seen an alarming number of container
dry cargo ship fires including Yantian Express, APL Vancouver, Grande America, E.R. Kobe and KMTC Hong Kong.
The escalation is of growing concern and the International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI) has called for an
urgent improvement to onboard firefighting systems.
At a recent conference in Arendal, Norway, organised by marine insurer and P&I Club, Gard, and attended by IMO, flag
states, shipowners, salvors, class, and insurers, IUMI strengthened its position on this global issue.
Helle Hammer, Chair of IUMI’s Policy Forum, explains: “Fire-fighting capabilities onboard containerships are
deficient and we need to see more headway to improve the safety of the crew, the environment, the cargo and the ships
themselves.
“Mis and non-declaration of cargo has serious safety implications and is the root cause behind these tragic
incidents. There is agreement among experts that the current means of controlling a fire in the cargo hold are of
little effect.
“The safety objectives set out in SOLAS do not seem to be met, and in light of the various recent casualties the
time for action is now.”
During the IMO’s 101st Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) meeting in June 2019, IUMI raised its concerns about
container ship fires and received support from various quarters, including IACS.
Now, in partnership with the German flag state, IUMI is calling for additional support from flag administrations and
other stakeholders to bring this issue to IMO’s agenda in 2020.
In 2017, IUMI published a position paper to raise a variety of concerns including inadequate fire detection and
onboard firefighting systems both on deck and under deck; and the need to revise SOLAS. This position paper will provide
the foundation for the IMO proposal.
“Our position paper recommends that firefighting systems should be arranged to segregate the ship into fire
compartments where the fire can be isolated to prevent it from spreading.
“Onboard systems could then cool the containers and allow them to burn out in a controlled manner.
“Fixed monitors to adequately attack the fire and improved fire detection system are further measures proposed to
allow for an appropriate response mechanism.
“Better prevention measures must also address the concerning rise in cargo mis-declaration. The sad reality is
that we can no longer sit idle. Containerships are increasing in size and complexity and this will only exacerbate
the problem.”
The IUMI is calling for all stakeholders to work together and encourage IMO to
Chao Wei, ... Stephen Liu, in Handbook of Environmental Degradation of Materials (Third
Edition), 2018
Bulk carriers and oil tankers experienced a large number of losses during the 1970s to 1990s. The International
Association of Classification Societies (IACS) took a multiyear initiative and developed the Unified Requirements (UR)
with the aim of improving the structural strength of bulk carriers and oil tankers. Higher levels of corrosion-
protection requirements were added during the design stage to account for the confirmed higher levels of wastage
due to corrosion, cargo handling, or other causes such as gas released from cargo.
In the 2000s, the IACS developed the Common Structural Rules (CSR), which created the industry standards for
building tankers and bulk carriers (IACS, 2016). The IACS CSR was developed on the foundation of first principles, limit
state design, identified structural failure modes, applications of advanced analytical tools such as finite-element
method, miner’s rules for fatigue damage estimates, etc. The CSR values of corrosion-prevention practices are
predefined based on statistical analysis of extensive corrosion wastages records. The wastage allowance that triggers
plate renewal are rationalized.
The design, construction, and operation of this type of ship has attracted considerable attention over the years, as
it became evident that the speed of loading/discharging as well as the sequence of the holds (where cargoes were
loaded/discharged) resulted in structural problems and even catastrophic failures.
As a result of these incidents, the calculations of certain strength members of the ship had to be reviewed, with
additional material being introduced in the hull areas that required strength improvements.
The single-deck design format of the cargo holds is that of a totally unobstructed box. This enables the carriage of
dry bulk cargoes, such as grain, iron, coal, and concentrates of iron, bauxite, and aluminum.
The cargo holds’ assembly is a rectangular prism [or cuboid], with the accommodation, navigating bridge and engine
room arranged at the after end and with the bow arranged at the forward end (Figure 11).
Large bulk carriers usually rely on port facilities for off-loading and these are generally similar to
that depicted in Fig. 3.6. Intermediate bulk carriers, however, often have onboard facilities for self-off-
loading. Such vessels are often used for the transfer of materials, such as cement, to storage depots at ports for local
supply or to off-shore drilling rigs.
Materials are typically transferred from storage holds in the ship by a combination of air-assisted gravity
conveyors and vacuum conveying systems, into twin blow tanks located in the center of the vessel. High-pressure air
is supplied by onboard diesel driven compressors and materials are conveyed to dockside storage facilities through
flexible rubber hose, which solves the problems of both location and tidal movements.
The rate at which these large vessels are lost is a matter of great concern. Between 1973 and 1996 the losses
amounted to 375. The fatality rate is likewise disturbing; for the same period it was about 150 per year, one-fifth of
the total average loss rate for all shipping. Furthermore, little is known about the manner in which these ships
foundered and whether or not thereis a common design fault. Technical aspects of this problem are reviewed by
Jubb,9 and Faith10 describes three of the losses in detail.
To date the most thorough investigation of a casualty is that of theDerbyshire. This 170 000 ton ship had been
built in 1976 at the SwanHunter shipyard on the River Tyne. In September 1980 she sank during a tropical storm in the
South China sea whilst en route from Seattle toYokohama with a cargo of iron ore. All 44 persons on board were
lost. Noradio distress call was received, so it is assumed that a sudden catastrophic event occurred. Relatives of the
deceased believed at the time that there had been a structural failure due to a design fault, such that the aft portion
of the ship had parted from the forward cargo-carrying part. Some engineers shared this view, noting that, amongst other
evidence, brittle cracks had been found in the deck plating of one of the Derbyshire’s sister ships.
Accordingly the families’ association, with financial support from theInternational Transport Federation, set up an
underwater search. In June1994 the wreck was located at a depth of 14 000 ft (just over two and a halfmiles),
scattered over a distance of a mile from east to west. At this pointthe available funds ran out. The British government
then financed a further search by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute of Massachusetts. Thewreck was fully mapped and
it was found that the stern portion was separated from the forward part by a distance of 600 m. This was a clear
indication that the ship had sunk in one piece. If the stern portion had separated at the surface it is most unlikely
that the forward part, which contained numbers of watertight bulkheads, would have sunk at the same time. It would have
remained afloat for some time, driven by the wind, and the two wrecks would have been widely separated. Thus, the
structural weakness hypothesis was discounted and attention concentrated instead onthe potential weakness of
the hatch covers. The strength of these items was calculated to be about one-tenth that of the deck itself. One
small hatch cover was missing and others were stove-in (although this could have happened as the ship was sinking). The
sudden inundation of water into acargo hold might well cause the ship to dive like a submarine, precluding
any distress signal.
Data will decide success in the next normal of bulk and tanker shipping
COVID-19 and commodity-related trends are likely to depress medium-term demand, but companies that can leverage deep
market insights will have the opportunity to outperform in the postcrisis economy.
ulk shipping has been attenuated for the past decade, despite some short-lived rebounds. In the medium term,
the impact of COVID-19 and commodity trends is likely to continue to depress demand, dampen rates, and pose a number of
other logistical challenges to the bulk and tanker shipping sector.
Even in this challenging environment, however, we see potential opportunities to outperform. Data is more accessible
than ever, which means companies can access deep market insights around economic and commodity trends, shipping
analytics, and customer information. Industry players that invest in analytics can use data-led insights to seize
opportunities in four main areas: finding attractive subsectors and niches, optimizing vessel portfolios, improving
commercial choices, and operating existing vehicles more effectively.
The bulk and tanker shipping industry has historically been characterized by more instinctive decision making (based
on judgment and experience), so this will require a step change in analytics capability. The investment will be
significant, but those companies that fully leverage the new data sources and cutting-edge analytics techniques will be
well positioned and resilient in the postcrisis world.
Declining demand has led to sluggish growth in bulk and tanker shipping during the past decade. COVID-19 has
compounded many of these issues; the slowdown in global economic growth has further decelerated demand for key bulk
commodities, leading to a sustained oversupply of shipping capacity. The bulk shipping market grew at a CAGR of just 1.3
percent between 2015 and 2020, for example, and growth rates are expected to hover at around 0.8 percent per annum until
2030, with the fall in growth driven largely by declining Chinese demand for coal and iron ore.1
Despite slowing demand, the supply capacity of the dry bulk shipping market is expected to continue to increase.
Shipbuilding is expected to add 3 to 4 percent to active capacity annually in the next ten years, while decommissioning
will remove around 1 to 2 percent. The comparatively low rate of ship scrapping is due both to the relatively young age
of the global dry bulk fleet (average tanker ship age is
10.2 years2 ) and to the low price of scrap. Overall, therefore, supply will increase at a CAGR of 1 to 3 percent.
This mismatch between weak demand and growing supply could depress rates over the coming years (Exhibit 1). Rates
for dry bulk shipping experienced a surge before the 2008 financial crisis because of the strong demand for many
commodities (including iron ore, coal, and grains), but have remained low since, and are not expected to rebound in the
coming years.
The tanker shipping sector also faces significant challenges. COVID-19 and a number of recent geopolitical
challenges have had a significant impact for major commodities such as crude oil (Exhibit 2). Shipping demand has
contracted sharply and—despite a slight short-term rebound—is expected to remain at a low level in the medium term,
and then decline further after 2032 as a result of the energy transition. Tanker shipping capacity is likely to grow
steadily, driven by a large number of outstanding orders. Again, this low demand growth and steady supply growth will
likely lead to a sustained oversupply of tanker shipping capacity in the next five years.Uncertainty around
environmental regulation may negate some of the projected excess shipping capacity. There is still a lack of clarity
around several environmental questions, including the level of greenhouse-gas reduction targets and the right fuel
choice for the future. Ongoing uncertainty might dampen shipbuilding orders by the mid-2020s. This would go some way
toward matching industry supply and demand.
Despite the global industry outlook, some submarkets remain attractive (Exhibit 3). Iron ore, for example, is a
large, stable, and profitable market—though it will start to shrink during the coming years. Our modeling indicates the
Chinese market drives around 70 percent of the global seaborne iron ore shipment. Chinese iron ore imports are expected
to fall from 990 million tons in 2019 to 769 million tons in 2030 (a decrease of around 2.4 percent per year), however,
because of China’s declining demand for steel, increasing supply of scrap, and rising adoption of the electronic arc
furnace.
The global markets for grain and bauxite are also stable and potentially profitable, though they are smaller. Both
markets will also grow over the coming years. Soybeans are expected to have a high growth rate, rising from 130 million
tons in 2020 to 163 million tons in 2030. Bauxite shipping will grow rapidly in the next five years, and then stabilize.
The shape of bauxite supply and demand will also change. Guinea will contribute more than 70 percent of global bauxite
exports. China will drive demand, and bauxite is expected to make up 80 percent of Chinese imports from Guinea by 2023.
Data-driven insights such as these on which cargoes are growing and where should be used to inform all commercial
decisions (see sidebar “About McKinsey’s trade model methodology”). Shipping companies should fully leverage as many
data sources as possible to triangulate and improve accuracy, and should be guided by the following principles.
Be open to new cargo categories and new routes. The shape of global supply and demand is shifting, and shipping
companies will need to be ready to adapt. Companies should make sure all routes and types of cargo are in the scope of
research, including those with which they are not yet familiar. Companies that can get ahead of developing route or
commodity trends may be able to pick up a considerable amount of new business. For example, China accounts for a large
proportion of soybean imports, which it currently sources mostly from the United States and Brazil. In the future,
however, the evolving global trading environment and domestic policy changes mean that emerging regions are likely to
account for an increased portion of China’s soybean imports.
Get closer to customers. Customers are important sources of data and insight. Shipping companies that can
cultivate strong customer relationships will have a better chance of understanding their future plans, and therefore of
finding ways to serve them—both through core shipping and through value-added services (such as blending and
transshipment).
Dredge, large floating device for underwater excavation. Dredging
has four principal objectives: (1) to develop and maintain greater depths than naturally exist for canals, rivers, and
harbours; (2) to obtain fill to raise the level of lowlands and thus create new land areas and improve drainage and
sanitation; (3) to construct dams, dikes, and other control works for streams and seashore; and (4) to recover
subaqueous deposits or marine life having commercial value.
Dredges are classed as mechanical and hydraulic. Many special types in both classes, and combinations of the two,
have been devised. All types of dredges may have living quarters on board. Though dredges have been constructed to
remove many kinds of deposits, the bulk of material removed has consisted of sand and mud.
A dipper dredge is essentially a power shovel mounted on a
non propelled barge for marine use. Distinctive
features are the bucket and its arm, the boom that supports and guides the arm and is mounted to work around a wide arc,
and the mechanism that gives excavating movement to the bucket. A grab, or clamshell, dredge lowers, closes, and raises a single bucket by means of flexible cables. In
operation the bucket is dropped to the bottom, where it bites because of its weight and the action of the bucket-closing
mechanism. A grab dredge can work at virtually unlimited depths. A ladder dredge employs a continuous chain of
buckets rotating around a rigid adjustable frame called a ladder. When the ladder is lowered to the bottom at a slant,
the empty buckets descend along the underside to the bottom, where they dig into the mud; the loaded buckets return
along the ladder’s upper side and dump at the top. The scraper dredge, also called a dragline, handles material
with a scoop suspended from a swinging boom. The scoop is drawn forward by a line attached to the front, while a second
line attached to the rear holds the scoop at the proper angle to slice the earth away as the device is pulled along. A
hydraulic dredge makes use of a centrifugal pump. In the pump casing, an impeller expels by centrifugal action a
mixture of solids, water, and gases. As a partial vacuum is created within the pump, atmospheric pressure on
the outside water surface and the weight of the water itself (hydrostatic pressure) both act to force water and
suspended solids from the bottom through the suction pipe into the pump. The materials emerging from the pump are
conveyed into barges or through another pipe to the shore. Long stakes, called spuds, are frequently used to pinion
a dredge to the bottom.
Groin, in coastal engineering, a long, narrow structure built out into the water from a beach in order to prevent
beach erosion or to trap and accumulate sand that would otherwise drift along the beach face and nearshore zone under
the influence of waves approaching the beach at an angle. A groin can be successful in stabilizing a beach on the
updrift side, but erosion tends to be aggravated on the downdrift side, which is deprived by the groin structure of
replenishment by drifting sand. Partly to counteract this tendency, often multiple groins are built in so-called groin
fields, which can stabilize a larger beach area. See also breakwater; jetty.
Dry dock, type of dock (q.v.) consisting of a rectangular basin dug into the shore of a body of water and
provided with a removable enclosure wall or gate on the side toward the water, used for major repairs and overhaul of
vessels.
When a ship is to be docked, the dry dock is flooded, and the gate removed. After the vessel is brought in, and
properly positioned and guyed, the watertight gate is placed in its seat and the dock is pumped dry, bringing the craft
gradually to rest on supporting blocks anchored to the floor.
In older installations, in which the basins were relatively small, the dock structure was built mainly of massive
stonework, or in a few instances, heavy timber framing. Later, these materials were supplanted by concrete, first
in the ordinary mass form and later reinforced with steel. Modern dry docks are considerably larger in size and
correspondingly more complex than their prototypes.
A dry dock gate, with its removable watertight barrier, has many forms and arrangements. In some, two leaves form a
mitre gate hinged to the side walls of the dock. In others, the leaves roll on a track into recesses in the dock walls.
In still others, a one-piece gate is hinged at the bottom sill so it may be lowered to allow a ship to enter. The type
most commonly used, however, is the floating gate, which is held in its seat by its weight when the dock is empty and
can be removed simply by floating it out of the way when the dock is filled with water.
While most ship repair work is carried out in stationary dry docks, there are some services that can be performed by
mobile or floating structures. The principal such facility, the floating dry dock, is a trough-shaped cellular
structure, used to lift ships out of the water for inspection and repairs. The ship is brought into the
channel of the partly submerged dock, which is then floated by removing ballast from its hollow floor and walls and
draining the dock so that it supports the craft on blocks attached to the dock floor. A typical floating dry dock is
built of steel, with a framing system similar to that of a ship, although both timber and reinforced
concrete have been used. Floating dry docks ordinarily are operated in sheltered harbours where wave action
presents no problem.
Evolution of global marine fishing fleets and the response of fished resources
We independently reconstructed vessels number, engine power, and effort of the global marine fishing fleet, in both
the artisanal and industrial sectors. Although global fishing capacity and effort have more than doubled since 1950 in
all but the most industrialized regions, the nominal catch per unit of effort (CPUE) has comparatively decreased.
Between 1950 and 2015 the effective CPUE, among the most widely used indicator to assess fisheries management and stocks
well being, has decreased by over 80% for most countries. This paper highlights the large differences in the development
of sectorial fishing fleets regionally. This detailed paper empowers future exploration of the drivers of these changes,
critical to develop sector and regionally specific management models targeting global fisheries sustainability.
Previous reconstructions of marine fishing fleets have aggregated data without regard to the artisanal and
industrial sectors. Engine power has often been estimated from subsets of the developed world, leading to inflated
results. We disaggregated data into three sectors, artisanal (unpowered/powered) and industrial, and reconstructed the
evolution of the fleet and its fishing effort. We found that the global fishing fleet doubled between 1950 and 2015—
from 1.7 to 3.7 million vessels. This has been driven by substantial expansion of the motorized fleet, particularly, of
the powered-artisanal fleet. By 2015, 68% of the global fishing fleet was motorized. Although the global fleet is
dominated by small powered vessels under 50 kW, they contribute only 27% of the global engine power, which has increased
from 25 to 145 GW (combined powered-artisanal and industrial fleets). Alongside an expansion of the fleets, the
effective catch per unit of effort (CPUE) has consistently decreased since 1950, showing the increasing pressure of
fisheries on ocean resources. The effective CPUE of most countries in 2015 was a fifth of its 1950s value, which was
compared with a global decline in abundance. There are signs, however, of stabilization and more effective management in
recent years, with a reduction in fleet sizes in developed countries. Based on historical patterns and allowing for the
slowing rate of expansion, 1 million more motorized vessels could join the global fleet by midcentury as developing
countries continue to transition away from subsistence fisheries, challenging sustainable use of fisheries'
resources.
Marine fisheries support global food security (1), human livelihood, employment (2), as well as global trade (3) and
will continue to do so in the foreseeable future with the benefit of wise management.
Understanding fishing capacity is paramount to its management (4) and failure to manage fisheries compromises all of
the services these vital resources offer. Although the importance of knowledge of fish stocks is undeniable, it cannot
be disassociated from the fishing processes themselves. Catch per unit of effort (CPUE) is still a widely used measure
of the well being of a fished stock (5), which cannot be estimated without some measure of the fishing capacity, defined
hereafter in its simplest form—the number of existing fishing boats. Although there has been significant work to
collect global fishing fleet data, most notably by the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), gaps in
the data are nontrivial, and no satisfying method has been found that fills them and allows for comparison or prediction
without major and often flawed assumptions (6).
Although progress has been made toward reconstructing the historical size and power of the global fishing fleet
(6, 7), several inconsistencies are apparent in the results. This is partially because public records aggregate
disparate fishing fleets into one component as if they were easily interchangeable units. It is, however, well
understood that global fishing fleets consist of, at least, two separable components: “artisanal” and “industrial,”
the former comprising both motorized and unmotorized elements. These components of the fleet, although interacting, are
different in their scope and aims (8) and vary vastly in their regional definitions. The industrial fleets are better
documented and reported than artisanal fleets (9), specifically how they developed to exploit often distant fish stocks,
which could not be fished efficiently by artisanal fishers. Recent technological progress, particularly in electronic
monitoring systems, has provided a substantial volume of information on the composition and behavior of the larger
components of the industrial fleet (10). In contrast, the extent and impact of the artisanal fishing fleet is
underestimated in the literature. This paper aims to strengthen the knowledge of the global marine fishing fleets by
reconstructing the number and engine power of artisanal and industrial fishing vessels.
For centuries, fishing vessels used sails and
oars as propulsion methods. The introduction of steam-powered trawlers and the subsequent improvements in propulsion had
a dramatic effect on the efficiency of fishing vessels, their spatial reach, and on landings; perhaps best documented in
the Northern Atlantic (11). Whereas the focus nowadays is on industrial fishing operations, a vast portion of global
fishing still occurs at artisanal levels (12, 13). Furthermore, as the research on fisheries is biased toward the
developed world, the impact of the unpowered artisanal fishing fleet is often overlooked in academic studies. As up to a
quarter of fishing vessels are unmotorized globally (1), neglecting this component of the fleet and its transition
through technological advances results in vast underestimates of the impact of fishing, particularly, in the poorest
parts of the world. Improved understanding of the motorization of the fishing fleet and taking a step back from focusing
almost exclusively on detailed industrial fleets are fundamental for both reconstructing the past and for predicting the
future evolution of fishing fleets. In this paper, we compiled data from various sources to fill in the gaps in the
knowledge of global marine fishing fleets, particularly, their history and level of motorization, the separation to
artisanal (both motorized and unmotorized, referred hereafter as “powered-artisanal” and “unpowered-artisanal”) and
industrial sectors, and their fishing effort.
The number of vessels in the global marine fishing fleet doubled from 1.7 in 1950 to 3.7 million in 2015 (Fig. 1A).
This increase is heterogeneous across the globe with a drastic increase in the size of the fishing fleet of Asia
(defined hereafter as the countries in East Asia and the Indian Peninsula and excluding the Middle East, which were
grouped instead with the Maghreb under “Arab World”), only slightly compensated by a fleet reduction in developed
countries, such as observed in North America and Western Europe in the 1990s.